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1. Contract savings schemes for housing 
(bausparen) in an emerging markets context 
Housing is an endless topic for dinner party chats in Belarus as well as in Germany. 
This is not surprising since housing is often the single biggest component of their 
wealth. For example, housing in Western Europe accounts for as much as 30 – 40 % 
of total household wealth. If people do not have a house, there is a strong desire to 
have one (or at least to renovate the own house). In this context, the question of how 
to finance such transactions is raised which is in a strong correlation with affordability, 
in particular for low to middle income groups. 
When do bauspar systems appear suitable to implement in emerging housing finance 
systems? 
• Affordability: the Department of Housing and Urban Development (USA) defines 
“affordable housing” as a home which costs less than 30 % of a family’s income in 
either rent or a monthly mortgage. When households pay more than 30 % of a 
family income, they tend to skimp on other necessities, such as health care. Poor 
access to housing loans, especially for low to middle income groups, is usually 
caused by: 
• Ill-functioning legal conditions: the existence of a working legislation and 
stable institutions (e.g. Central Bank) are an essential prerequisite for a 
functioning banking sector. As for housing finance, incomplete land registries 
for example make it rather difficult to convert property into liquid funds 
through a mortgage (since there is no clear, registered title to the land and 
the registration of the mortgage in the land register). 
• Underdeveloped retail financial markets: a poorly-developed banking sector 
lacks the capacity of providing long-term capital for long-term investments. 
Often, property value monitoring is hardly achievable. Thus, banks hesitate to 
enter into housing finance. 
• One consequence of an ill-functioning banking sector is an absence of long-
term savings/low official savings ratios. In addition, other institutional long-
term investors (pension funds, insurance companies etc.) remain 
underdeveloped. Coupled with that, people prefer to put their savings into 
“shoe-boxes” instead of channelling them into the banks, which could use 
these funds to finance medium/long-term housing investments. To give you an 
example, experts estimate that the shoe box money in Russia amounts up to 
USD 20 billion – 50 billion (in foreign currency, as a result of the financial 
crisis of 1998 because the confidence in the stability of the Ruble is still 
limited). 
• Income: typically, the residential mortgage markets in transitions economies 
are characterised by vast differences between house prices and the incomes of 
the citizens. In addition, banks face substantial difficulties taking into 
consideration the legal, but undeclared incomes when assessing the 
creditworthiness of the potential borrowers. However, these incomes account 
for a considerable share of private household revenues. 
In conclusion, we may identify three main reasons why market based long-term 
finance for housing is difficult to obtain in transition economies, especially for middle 
and lower income groups: 
1. High inflation rates have been so far an obstacle for long-term savings. As a result, 
banks lack long-term funding sources in order to finance long-term projects (e.g. 
housing). 
 3
2. Ambiguous attitude of banks towards property as collateral; foreclosure is often 
difficult. 
3. Banks focus on corporates. Retail banking is limited to selected customers (higher 
income groups) and few transactions/services (e.g. credit cards, payment cards, 
consumer loans and payment services). 
How can bauspar systems offer a solution to combat housing shortages? 
With rising economic growth, demand for housing also increases in Belarus. In this 
context, bauspar systems may help mitigate housing shortages and improve housing 
affordability. Before implementing bauspar systems, answers to the following 
questions should be found: 
• When are bauspar systems likely to be successful in mobilising long-term savings 
for housing? Why will a household (especially middle and lower income groups) 
conclude a bauspar-contract? When is a bauspar-contract attractive for them? 
• How do bauspar systems react under changing macroeconomic and financial 
market conditions? When will a bank offer bauspar-contracts? 
• Which risks does the bauspar system entail, both to the banks that offer them and 
to the government that support them? How do bauspar systems contribute to the 
development of financial markets and the housing sector? What kind of difficulties 
do financial authorities face in regulating bausparkassen? 
The objective of this paper is to give you an answer to these questions raised. In 
addition, the answers will be supported by examples of already existing bauspar 
systems. 
2. How do bauspar systems work? 
The bauspar system offers a dedicated loan-linked form of saving. It links a phase of 
contractual savings remunerated below market interest rates to the promise of a 
housing loan at a rate fixed below market at the time of the conclusion of the 
bauspar-contract. Originally designed to provide long-term funds to be specifically 
channelled into the housing sector at a time when long-term finance was not available 
and reconstruction was a national priority, bauspar systems have won a positive 
record in continental Europe. 
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In general, the bauspar contract is designed in a way that the accumulation of savings 
is linked to a loan offer. Thus, we can differentiate four elements: 
1. Conclusion of the contract with the following items such as specific contract sum 
(in our example € 10,000), savings rate, repayment rate, interest rates for the 
savings and the loan etc. 
2. Savings period: up to 40 – 50 % of this amount will be saved (= € 4,000 - 
€ 5,000) in monthly instalments. The use of the funds is restricted to housing 
purposes. 
3. Allocation period: in general, the customer saves for 3 or 5 years, before a loan 
offer will be made to him. Once the customer has completed the savings period, he 
is entitled to a loan. The size of the loan is usually the difference between the 
contract sum and the amount saved (e.g. in our case € 6,000 - € 4,000). 
4. Since the bauspar system is managed as a closed system, banks can only allocate 
those saved funds in form of loans to the customers, which the banks have 
previously collected. Hence, customers are subject to a waiting period the length of 
which depends on the availability of funds. The challenge for the bausparkasse in 
managing such an “allocation pool” is to balance fluctuating inflow and outflow of 
funds in order to meet all the future loan demands of the customers within a 
reasonable time span. Short and consistent waiting periods are an important factor 
of the attractiveness of the system. Therefore, specific queuing rules determine the 
sequence of the loan disbursements to the customers. 
5. Loan period: the customer repays his loan on the basis of the agreed interest rate. 
A sound financing structure for a home 
In Germany, you will regularly find the following financing structure: a combination of 
a bauspar loan and a mortgage loan has appeared as a good solution of a balanced 
financing structure of a home. The bauspar-funds which account for roughly 30 % of 
the purchase price of a home supplements the mortgage loan (50 % of purchase 
price) and the down-payment (20 % of purchase price). The bauspar system has a 
complementary function. 
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Conclusion: From a financial perspective, the bauspar contract introduces an option 
component to the contract. The customer has the right, but not the obligation, to call 
a loan at pre-specified terms from the bank. Since there is no free lunch, the price for 
the option is the interest rate in the savings period below market and a possible 
waiting period in the allocation period. This option may be very valuable to the 
customer for three reasons: the loan is typically at a below market rate, interest rates 
are fixed over the whole lifetime of the contract for the savings and the loan (safeness 
of interest rates) and the customer benefits from a simple underwriting process to 
receive the loan proceeds. This option may be perceived as very valuable in a market 
where mortgage loans are not yet generally available i.e. capital markets do not work 
and many households do not have experience with the formal financial sector. 
3. General features of bauspar systems in transition economies 
The different features of bauspar systems will be regrouped according to the 
participating parties: customers, financial institutions and the government. Each 
member has different expectations and concerns on bauspar systems (overlaps 
cannot be avoided): 
Government 
Households/customers Financial institutions
Bauspar system
General features of bauspar systems in transition 
Economies
 
Customers’ (households’) view: 
• Credit option of the bauspar-contract: the guarantee of a loan for which the 
customer does not have to qualify at the time of contract completion may have a 
significant value for him. He is able to demonstrate his creditworthiness through 
regular savings which the lending bank may regard as a substitute for a lacking 
credit history. An additional incentive is that banks rarely offer long-term fixed rate 
loans or offer these only with excessive rates. 
• Inflation rate: one precondition for saving activities are stabilising or stable 
inflation rates. In Belarus, the inflation rate is expected to fall to 8 – 10 % 
(according to governmental estimates). 
• Financing of renovation or modernisation measures: Since the average amount for 
these project oscillates around € 3,000 – 6,000, the bauspar loan offers to the 
customer an interesting alternative because a consumer loan is too expensive. 
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Furthermore, a mortgage bank starts lending from € 50,000 because small loan 
amounts are not profitable for the mortgage bank. 
Financial institutions which want to offer bauspar-contracts: 
• Credit risk: the greatest attraction of bausparen for lenders probably lies in their 
capacity to lower credit risk because a successful saver has demonstrated his 
ability to budget and set aside a portion of income for savings during an extended 
period (at least 3 to 5 years). Such behaviour indicates that he will probably be a 
reliable borrower, too. As a result, lending to a bauspar-client is perceived as less 
risky than lending to an average borrower. This assumption can be confirmed by 
surveys from Germany which reveal that people with bauspar-contracts show a 
lower number of foreclosures sales in comparison with borrowers without a 
bauspar-contract (as per 1998 0.15 %). Moreover, the default rate of the German 
bausparkassen was about 0.02 % of their entire loan portfolio. 
• Liquidity risk in view of volatile inflation rates i.e. interest rates: the key risk of the 
bauspar system is liquidity risk, or the risk that banks will have insufficient funds 
to meet future loan demands. The possibility of a cash shortfall arises when the 
cash from new deposits and existing loan payoffs is insufficient to fund loan 
commitments (i.e. loans to savers who have completed the savings period).  
• The magnitude of liquidity risk is determined by three factors: First, the duration of 
the loans and the savings deposits: the longer the maturities of the savings and 
the loan period the lower is liquidity risk. Second, the loan-to-savings multiple: the 
larger the multiple, the greater the liquidity risk. Third, the nature of the loan 
commitment: liquidity risk is lower if the bank determines funding of the loan 
commitment.1 
• Interest rate risk is in a closed bauspar-system limited by contract design. Rates 
on savings and the loan are fixed for the maturity of the contract and do not vary 
with market conditions. The spread between the interest rate on the savings and 
the loan is usually 200 - 300 BP, i.e. the credit interest rate is 2 % p.a. and the 
debit interest rate is 4 – 5 % p.a.2 In an open bauspar-system (e.g. French 
épargne logement system) interest rate risk is of greater concern. 
• Relationship with the customer: signing a bauspar-contract implies that the bank 
will enter into a relationship with the customer for at least six years and most often 
for 15 to 20 years. This long-term link allows for the bank to deepen the 
relationship and to offer various possibilities for cross-selling. According to the 
graph, German customers who have acquired a bauspar product, buy at least two 
to three additional products from the bank, which sells bauspar contracts. 
                                                 
1 Inflation rates have a major impact on the flow of funds into the bauspar system since the bausparkassen offer 
savings with a below market interest rate. In order to manage liquidity risk, bausparkassen must ensure continued 
attractiveness to new savers, which is a function of both the savings return and the availability of loans. However, 
existing contractual obligations will always be met because the allocation fund is filled up by both the savings and 
redemption payments. This means, the bausparkasse can also use the proceeds from the allocation fund to pay back 
the savings. As a consequence, a bausparkasse will constantly adapt the bauspar-product to the changing market 
conditions (inflation rate/interest rate) in which it operates. Therefore, a bausparkasse needs a concept which allow 
the banks to modify the conditions of the contract in order to meet future demand. However, modifications should only 
be applied for the next “saver-generation”. Otherwise, confidence into the system will deteriorate. 
2 Average condition of bauspar contracts in Germany.  
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Government’s view: 
• Mobilisation of funds: the government views bausparen as a useful tool to mobilise 
funds in order to promote housing output expansion. Bauspar systems are often 
understood to improve the access to credit for middle and lower income groups 
because they have the ability to show their financial discipline (through regular 
savings). 
• In this context, the bauspar system can be a means of managing the issue of legal, 
but undeclared income. To the degree that an individual or couple may sustain a 
given monthly allocation to savings, they may establish their capacity to sustain a 
comparable mortgage payment, even if it seems high in terms of their reported 
salary. 
• Subsidies: Governments, which intend to mobilise saving activities, may consider 
the introduction of subsidies to induce savings activities, especially for middle and 
lower income groups. The underlying rationale for such a policy is that the linkage 
between savings and accessing an ownership subsidy may prove very efficient in 
building up the financial resources of the household before owning a house. 
Bausparen may be one way of achieving this goal. It is evident that other 
possibilities also exist 
• Subsidies are also aimed at supporting the transformation of short-term savings to 
long-term savings and investments. Under these circumstances, the government 
wishes to encourage housing demand which should be relatively independent from 
the development of market interest rates and cyclical motions.  
• The crucial question for the government is the optimum deployment of the 
subsidies related to budget resources and their effects on housing activities. Two 
criteria may measure the effectiveness of subsides: relative and absolute 
magnitude and potential for distortion.  
• The introduction of subsidies serves to induce savings activities (start-up effect). 
However, subsidies should not be used to keep a system running (magnitude). 
Otherwise, we may observe a substitution effect: people channelling their savings 
into it in order to receive the subsidy instead of using them for housing purposes. 
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We may then observe rent-seeking effects which lead to market distortions 
(potential for distortion). The money once spent in order to serve a well-accepted 
goal will be wasted. Therefore, the system should be self-sustainable. For example, 
subsidies should be linked to the use of the funds for housing purposes. If real 
interest rates are expected to decline and the probability of macroeconomic shocks 
is judged to be low, a lowering of the subsidy should not be excluded. 
• Stability of the bauspar system: long-term obligations require special protection so 
that customers are willing to entrust their savings to a bank because failures where 
depositors have lost money may have a lasting impact on the savings willingness 
and the viability of the institutions which administer them. Furthermore, the 
stability and attractiveness also depends on how people perceive the government’s 
conception of the bauspar system and how these institutions deliver the loan. 
Therefore, regulations must ensure that the bausparkassen are well managed. 
• Integration of bauspar system in financial markets: the establishment of the 
bauspar system should be consistent with the trend towards integration of financial 
markets. Specialised institutions may be viewed as an impediment to integrated 
financial markets because this approach implies less diversification and reduced 
cross-selling opportunities. Liquidity must be managed and monitored more 
carefully because of fewer possibilities to evade macroeconomic shocks. 
Furthermore, they cause additional costs to the institutional participants because 
the banks must be separately capitalised and competent staff in the supervisory 
bodies is needed to ensure the functioning and the stability of these banks.   
On the other hand, a clear focus may guarantee best that the flow of funds 
collected by them will be dedicated to housing purposes. Specialised institutions 
also underline the strict mutuality and transparency of the system: almost all funds 
come from savers (mutuality) and may be used only for housing loans 
(transparency). Since the bauspar funds are clearly separated from other 
activities, the supervisor can monitor flow of funds more easily. 
4. Examples of implemented bauspar systems 
The following countries have adopted bauspar systems comparable to the German 
bausparkassen model: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia. Operations of 
bausparkassen have started in Romania in 2004. Outside Europe, the bausparkassen 
have expanded to India. In China, activities have been launched this year. The 
introduction of bauspar systems has also been discussed in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Before tackling the question of how bauspar systems have been implemented in 
housing finance markets and what has been their outcome, I would like to briefly 
explain why bausparen has emerged in Germany. 
Since conditions in Belarus may be comparable to those in Germany one hundred 
years ago, the evolution of the German housing finance market may serve as a good 
example how to present housing finance solution to households, lenders and the 
government in Belarus. Berlin, which became the capital of the new Germany in 1870, 
attracted many investors. Poor housing and working conditions became the rule for 
the average worker. They lived in the so-called backyards in humid flats (the house at 
the front of the streets were reserved for the upper class). 
Having its roots in the United Kingdom about 300 years ago (Ketley’s Building Society 
in 1775), bausparen provided a sensible solution in view to the severe housing 
shortage and the restricted access of lower to middle income groups to housing 
finance. Founded as mutual self-help organisations, these “savings community” 
 9
became very attractive to the people which allowed them to regularly save and 
receive a loan according to pre-determined queuing rules. 
Initially, bausparkassen offered complete home financings like ordinary mortgage 
banks. However, this business model was restricted by the saver’s capacity and 
persistence. This restrictions became even clearer since the waiting periods became 
longer. Even if the offer of complete home financings was the result of the situation 
after World War I, the bausparkassen started specialising on loans secured by second 
ranked mortgages: universal banks and mortgage banks granted mortgage loans up 
to an LTV ratio of 60 %. Bausparkassen granted loans with an LTV ratio between 
60 % and 80 %. The remaining 20 % of the price for a home constituted the down-
payment. This “division of labour” between commercial banks and mortgage banks 
(home financings secured through first ranked mortgages) and bausparkassen (home 
financings secured through second ranked mortgages) has emerged and proven 
rather successful and was later confirmed by the government in its legislation for 
mortgage banks and bausparkassen (it is still working in that way today). 
It is now interesting to explore how the bauspar systems have reacted to the criteria 
formulated above: 
Bausparen in Germany 
• Households: 
• Attractiveness of product: the market share is roughly 30 % (2002); since 
1948, the bausparkassen have disbursed loans exceeding € 700 billion which 
have been invested in the construction of more than 14m homes. Every third 
person in Germany has a bauspar contract (about 26m contracts). Since the 
end of the 1990s, bausparkassen have managed to attract a rising volumes of 
contracts, especially since Germany has fallen into recession because people 
seek secure investments. 
• Financial institutions: 
• Provider: bausparkassen operate as specialised institutions. 
• Relationship with the customer: bauspar contracts are part of the allfinance 
strategy of nearly all commercial banks in Germany which shows the still on-
going viability of the system. 
• Credit risk: despite recession in Germany, the default rate of bausparkassen 
customers has only risen from 0.02 % as per 2001 to 0.04 % as per 
September 2003. 
• Liquidity risk: bausparkassen are not obliged to fund the bauspar-loan at a 
particular date. The average waiting period for loan allocation is currently zero 
(after the savings period). Liquidity management may be more transparent 
because funding beyond the pool will be visible in the balance sheet. 
• Interest rate risk is limited by contract design because rates are fixed during 
whole lifetime of contract. 
• Government view 
• As for mobilisation of funds, the bauspar system has proven as an effective 
tool. Bauspar funds were involved in the construction of 13 mio. dwellings 
since 1948. 
• Subsidies: payment is subject to income thresholds (taxable income up to 
€ 25,600 for single person and € 51,200 for married couple). Bonus is 8.8 % 
of annual savings up to a maximum of € 512 (single person) or € 1,024 
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(married couple). Thus, the bonus amounts to € 45.06 and € 90.11 
respectively. Furthermore, funds are to be placed for 7 years in the 
bausparkassen in order to receive the subsidy. There are no tax exemptions. 
Subsidies target lower and middle incomes groups. The payment of the 
premium is not regulated in the bausparkassen act, but in a different act 
called the act on savings premium dedicated to housing 
(Wohnungsbauprämiengesetz). This act is also aimed at supporting other 
savings models dedicated to housing with a premium. To date, the 
bausparkassen have been the only financial institutions which offer such 
products. 
• Stability: the bauspar system has contributed to stable financing structures. 
Even in times of economic decline, no massive rise of foreclosures sales has 
been observed  Many banks require a bauspar contract for the mortgage loan. 
• Integration in financial markets: most of the bausparkassen are subsidiaries of 
commercial banks which indicates their importance as a distribution outlet. 
Bausparen in Slovakia 
Housing construction financing is offered by bausparkassen, mortgage banks and the 
State Housing Development Fund (SHDF), a state-owned entity. The following graph 
gives an overview about their respective loan delivery (from 1996 – 2002): 
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Table: Housing Finance Volumes in SKK billion of banks, bausparkassen and 
the SHDF (1996 – 2002); source: OECD, author’s calculations. 
To date, bausparkassen have emerged as the most important providers of housing 
finance. The 3 bausparkassen, which operate in Slovakia, have achieved a total 
financing volume of € 2,063.7 mio. The ratio of granted housing loans to the volume 
of received housing bauspar-deposits amounts to 98 %. The figure means that 98 % 
of savings received (including subsidies) are disbursed in form of housing loans to the 
customers of the bausparkassen. Interest rates on savings vary between 2 % and 
4.5 % p.a. (market rates oscillate between 3 % and 6 % p.a.). Interest rates on 
bauspar-loans fluctuate between 2.75 % and 6 % p.a. (interest rates for mortgage 
loans between 7.5 % and 9 % p.a. excluding interest rate subsidies). Usually, terms 
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of bauspar-loans vary between 8 and 20 years. Funds are used for 
renovation/modernisation (37%), construction (23%) and purchase of home (40%). 
A rising volume of mortgage loans granted through banks and mortgage banks has 
emerged since 1999 when the government has introduced interest rate subsides. To 
date, the subsidised loans have accounted for more than half of all mortgage loans 
granted. Until the introduction of the interest rate subsidy, the volume of granted 
mortgage loans has been negligible (compared to other commercial activities of the 
banks). 
The establishment of the State Housing Development Fund (SHDF) is aimed at 
extending government aid to the improvement of the housing stock. The SHDF mainly 
grants advantageous long-term loans and non-recurring bonuses for the construction 
of dwellings or renovation/modernisation of houses. Since its inception in 1996, the 
government has channelled through the SHDF funds in the form of direct subsidies of 
€ 288 mio. to Slovakian citizens. 
The three participating parties have the following experiences with the bauspar 
system: 
• Households 
• Rising contract volumes and loan disbursements show a wide acceptance of 
the population. About 60 % of the bauspar customers conclude a new contract 
after completion of the previous contract. Bausparkassen are considered 
stable. 
• Attractiveness of product: about 2.6 mio. Slovaks have concluded a bauspar-
contract (about 50 % of the population). 
• Concerns about inflation: favourable macroeconomic conditions have 
encouraged growth of bauspar-funds. 
• Financial institutions 
• Bausparkassen have offered a alternative for ordinary bank financings. 
Customers mainly derive from middle and lower income groups. A balanced 
risk structure prevails. The default rate of all bausparkassen amounts to 
0.56 % of their whole portfolio. 
• Provider: bausparkassen operate as specialised institutions 
• Government: 
• Mobilisation of funds dedicated to housing has been effected. 
• Subsidies: the government has adapted the subsidy payments according to 
the development of the inflation rate and the bausparkassen. Subsidies have 
proven to be a beneficial catalyst to starting the system. 
• Integration in financial system: currently, bausparkassen are the only working 
loan providers for housing purposes. Especially of middle and lower income 
groups face difficulties obtaining a mortgage loan from a commercial bank. 
Recent developments of implemented bauspar systems in India and China 
In India, there is a large gap (55m) between the existing housing stock and the 
demand for new houses; the demand for new dwellings is expected to further increase 
by 20m units a year (in addition to the already existing gap). Especially low and 
middle income groups have no access to housing loans. In this context, 
microentrepreneurs (shop keepers, craftsmen, carriers etc.) have difficulties to prove 
a steady income. Through the savings mechanism of the bauspar system, they are 
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able to build up a stable payment history. A fully-fledged implementation of the 
bauspar system has taken place in March 2003. It is expected that the bauspar 
system attracts about 250,000 new customers per year. 
In China, the housing market is expected to grow by 10% annually (which is 
equivalent to about €1.3billion). The purchase price of an apartment (about 80 square 
metres) amount to €25,000.00. The average annual income is €3,800.00. The 
government wants the citizens to do their own provisions for housing finance. 
Therefore, citizens are in need of mechanisms which manage savings accounts and 
grant loans. The bauspar system has been effective in the province Tianjin since the 
beginning of 2004. Experts reckon that the contract volume in the next 3 years is 
likely to rise up to 160,000 (which corresponds to an expected financing volume of 
more than €1billion). 
5. General evaluation and conclusion 
Bauspar systems are aimed at increasing savings, indicating the creditworthiness of 
the future borrower and thereby channelling loans with an interest rate below market 
to housing (in order to complement market rate financing). In this context, 
bausparkassen have specialised in mortgage loans secured through second ranked 
mortgages and in granting loans to middle and lower income groups who often have 
no suitable access to credit mainly because of a lacking down-payment. 
The implementation of bauspar system in a transition economy requires a thorough 
evaluation of every feature of the system since households (customers), financial 
institutions and governmental bodies enter into long-term relations: 
Households (customers): 
Bauspar-contracts facilitate the accumulation of funds and offer the prospect of a low-
interest loan. They promote savings discipline and provide a concrete goal that many 
households consider important. 
Furthermore, they offer better access to credit which is particularly important for low 
and middle income groups because they have the ability to prove their financial 
discipline (through regular savings). As a result, they benefit from a better 
creditworthiness towards the bank (achievement of more favourable credit scores), 
particularly in countries with poorly functioning legal conditions. 
Bauspar systems also provide a buffer in case of difficulties: if a property is 100 % 
financed through mortgages, no room for manoeuvre will be left in case of declining 
house prices. The situation may worsen if customers have not agreed on fixed interest 
rates or if the fixed interest-period expired and they face higher interest rates for the 
next period. 
High inflation rates may lead to longer waiting periods if the inflow of funds into the 
bausparkassen slows down. 
In Belarus, borrowers also need money to finance the modernisation of renovation of 
their dwellings. These activities usually require lower demand for financing. In this 
context, bausparen offers an alternative since small loan amounts are available at 
reasonable prices. 
Financial institutions: 
For financial institutions, which envisage the implementation of bausparen, the system 
can help to overcome the severe information asymmetries they face in transition or 
developing countries where there are usually no retail financial markets, weak 
legislation and problematic income reporting. Bauspar systems are very effective in 
screening, monitoring and establishing the reputation of steady savers as future 
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borrowers. They are good at lowering credit risks because bauspar systems enhance 
the capacity and the willingness to repay the loan. They are also an important tool for 
developing and deepening the customer relationship (cross-selling). 
However, bauspar systems are subject to liquidity risk, since bauspar systems need a 
constant inflow of funds to meet future loan commitments. In case of volatile inflation 
rates (i.e. interest rates) it may be difficult to attract new savers. One decisive factor 
in this context are short and consistent waiting periods. 
The attractiveness of bauspar systems is closely related to the macroeconomic and 
legal conditions. It is therefore important that people perceive the institutions 
managing their funds as stable and viable so that they do not risk loosing their 
money. Close government regulation and supervision should be the crucial measure. 
Under these circumstances, the invitation of foreign investors may be a suitable step 
to build up such a system. The confidence in such a foreign-owned entity may be 
higher. 
Government: 
The underlying rationale for the government to promote the implementation of 
bauspar systems is that they help overcome information constraints on financial 
contracts and contribute to higher financial savings rates. Before introducing bauspar 
systems, however, policy makers should identify and thoroughly investigate two 
points: 
First, the general housing finance system that they intend to promote and how it will 
interact with the overall financial system. Second the financial costs and benefits of 
every option embedded in the proposed bauspar system. Areas to be regulated are 
the definition of the waiting period, duration of the savings period, requirements of 
reserve funds, general contract management and the supervision of the 
bausparkassen. 
A further point to be taken into consideration is the integration of the bauspar system 
in the overall national financial system. Bauspar systems may stabilise the prospects 
for development of market based housing finance systems and the banking sector as 
a whole. The question whether this goal may be best achieved through specialised 
institutions may be answered by the experience of Germany, Slovakia and India.3 
Hence, the basic function of the bauspar system is to assist the customers in building 
equity for down-payment and to complement the first mortgage loan. Since 
bausparkassen are specialised in housing finance for middle and lower income groups, 
they could contribute to the government’s objective to extend their access to housing 
finance. As a result, bauspar solutions will not only help offer sustainable housing 
finance solutions to low and middle income borrowers, but they will also pave the way 
for the development of broader capital market solutions in Belarus. 
 
 
Dr. Friedemann Roy 
Berlin, October 2004 
                                                 
3 A recent case is Mexico where the company “Hipotecaria Su Casita” operates as specialised institution for housing 
finance. The company was established in 1994. Today, it manages assets worth USD 1,300 mio. 65,000 loans have 
been granted yet. 
